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SECTION IV - Universal Jurisdiction 
DRAFT RESOLUTION 
CHALLENGE REPORT1 
Prof. Dr. Gert Vermeulen2 
 
Preamble 
The participants in the Preparatory Colloquium of the IVth Section of the XVIIIth International 
Congress of the International Association of Penal Law, held in Xi’an (China) (12-15 October 2007); 
Considering that universal jurisdiction could be one of the most effective instruments [suggested 
replacement of ‘could be one of the most effective instruments’ by: may prove valuable] to prevent 
and punish the most serious crimes recognized by International customary law, and particularly 
those reflected in the Statute of the ICC, by increasing the likelihood of prosecution and punishment 
of its [replace by: their] perpetrators; 
Reason: In many cases, notably in most cases where the suspect is not present in the territory of 
the state exercising universal jurisdiction and almost always in cases where the suspect is to be 
found in his/her state of nationality, especially when he/she exercise(s)/has exercised a 
government, diplomatic or otherwise official function there, extradition will not be granted. 
Consequently, no punishment will incur, nor will a conviction be pronounced. Exercising universal 
jurisdiction in such cases may even decrease or erode the general preventative potential of 
establishing universal jurisdiction for the crimes concerned. 
Therefore, universal jurisdiction can definitely not be considered ‘one of the most effective 
instruments’ to prevent and punish the most serious crimes *...+. It may prove valuable, however, 
be it in the majority of cases only where it can be reasonably expected that the presence of the 
suspect at the hearing of proceedings in the state exercising universal jurisdiction can be ensured 
(it is suggested to insert the latter condition below, in the actual text of the draft resolution, under 
the newly suggested heading II.A). 
Further, the notion of ‘the most serious crimes recognized by international customary law, and 
particularly those reflected in the Statute of the ICC’, seems problematic for a series of reasons 
(infra, under I.2). 
Keeping in mind [suggested replacement by: Recognizing] that [suggested insertion: the 
establishment and] exercise of universal jurisdiction by States will remain necessary [suggested 
replacement of ‘will remain necessary’ by: may remain useful] in order to prevent impunity for 
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international crimes as mentioned above, even after the establishment of the International Criminal 
Court; 
Reason: The preventative potential of universal jurisdiction does not necessarily require that States 
actually exercise such jurisdiction; it may be sufficient for them to have established jurisdiction (‘to 
prescribe’). Further, it is very arguable that universal jurisdiction, given its controversial nature (as 
outlined in the next recital) and bearing in mind that, even when speaking about the crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, the state exercise of jurisdiction is ‘necessary’, for is many cases (supra) 
nor punishment, nor conviction will be prompted and even the general preventative effect of the 
principle may be at risk. This does not imply, however, that the principle will be useless in all 
situations. Hence, it seems fair to ‘recognize’ the potential value of the principle, even after the 
establishment of the ICC. 
Mindful that universal jurisdiction has become one of the most controversial topics of criminal law 
related academic and non-academic debates; 
Remark: The controversial character of universal jurisdiction did not emerge from the above 
recitals, nor does it from the draft resolution below, which seems to rather one-sidedly promote 
state universal jurisdiction for the most serious crimes, failing to truly address the complexity of the 
issue in a sufficiently critical fashion or with the necessary sense of realism.   
Recalling the previous AIDP resolutions on this topic, in particular, those adopted by 
Suggestion: Delete these references altogether (reasoning given below) 
- the Third International Congress of Penal Law (Palermo, 3-8 April 1933), dealing with the subject 
“For what offences is it proper to admit universal competency?”. The resolution stated that 
“there are offences which are harmful to the interests common to all states”, and discerned a 
tendency towards a universal repression of certain of serious offences, which endanger the 
common interests of the states in their international relations; [the resolution is quite neutral in 
phrasing, not promoting nor recommending universal jurisdiction, but merely observing a 
tendency, which we do not really discern today, so that recalling this resolution does not add to 
the current congress’ debate] 
- the XIIIth International Congress of Penal Law (Cairo, 1 – 7 October 1984), inviting States to adopt 
the principle of universality in their national law for the most serious offences in order to ensure 
that such offences do not go unpunished; [the quoted phrase from the resolution is very 
unsophisticated, not reflecting in any way the complexity of the debate] 
Propose to the XVIIIth International Congress of the International Association of Penal Law the 
adoption of the following Resolution: 
I. Legitimacy of the principle under International law 
Remark: In this chapter, unlike what its title seems to suggest, the issue of legitimacy of the 
universal jurisdiction principle under international law is simply not addressed. As it is definitely 
worth addressing in the resolution, it is suggested to add new substance to the chapter’s current 
content (see in fine). 
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1. Universal jurisdiction is a complementary criterion of jurisdiction over those *‘those’ to be deleted; 
see French text: ‘des crimes’+ crimes committed abroad and [replace ‘and’ by ‘that are’, this in order 
to avoid any misunderstanding in the sense that the following part of the sentence would refer to 
‘universal jurisdiction’ instead of to ‘crimes’+ not covered by any other jurisdictional principle that 
this State may have. 
2. With the aim of assuring the protection of those fundamental interests recognized by the 
international community as a whole and preventing impunity, universal jurisdiction should be applied 
to investigate, prosecute and punish at least the most serious crimes recognized by International 
customary law, and particularly those reflected in the Statute of the ICC. 
Remark: Not only is universal jurisdiction promoted in an uncritical, normative/ideological fashion 
(leaving apart major problems with its application in many cases, even for ICC mandated crimes, as 
outlined above), the choice and delineation of offences for which the resolution recommends state 
universal jurisdiction seems to have been given insufficient thought (at least from the perspective 
of legitimacy under international law), for they seem: 
- vague (‘the most serious crimes recognized by international customary law’, whereas there 
is no absolute consensus about which crimes are recognized in international customary 
law); 
- misleading (piracy and slavery essentially being the sole crimes for which international 
customary law accepts ius cogens state universal jurisdiction, whereas international law for 
the majority of other international crimes, irrespective of whether they are footed in 
customary and/or convention law, does not call for state universal jurisdiction over them. 
The ‘mainstream’ – but erroneous – conviction that international law legitimizes or even 
requires states to establish and exercise universal jurisdiction for ‘international crimes’ 
seems to underlay the drafting of the resolution).  
- technically at least incorrect or doubtful on one point (the ’crime of aggression’, as an ICC 
mandated crime, is not ‘as such’ reflected in ‘international customary law’ (it remains 
uncertain to what extent it is interlinked with the notion ‘war of aggression’ as comprised 
in the international customary law notion ‘crimes against peace’, especially since an official 
ICC definition is still lacking), so that the use of ‘and particularly those’, presupposing that 
all ICC crimes are known crimes under international customary law, is incorrect; moreover, 
awaiting the 2010 Review Conference of the Rome Statute, which will consider the 
inclusion of a provision defining the crime of aggression, it seems rather pointless to call 
upon states to establish universal jurisdiction for it), and  
- at least very arguable, if not already contra legem, where it comes to the crime of genocide 
(the latter being an ICC mandated crime, covered at the same time by the 1948 Genocide 
Convention, which in Article VI only provides for territorial state jurisdiction or jurisdiction 
by an international penal tribunal, so that not even the possibility to establish 
extraterritorial jurisdiction for genocide may be derived from international law. In relation 
to the latter point, it is worth mentioning that for the other ICC mandated crimes reflected 
in international customary law, i.e. ‘crimes against humanity’ and  ‘war crimes’ (the latter 
being covered also by the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols thereto, from which a 
right for states to establish and exercise universal jurisdiction may indeed be implicitly 
derived when it comes to grave breaches of them), there is consensus that universal 
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jurisdiction over them may be established by states. The resolution turning this into a 
recommendation to do so, has no ground in international law, and remains disputable 
therefore even where ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’ are concerned. 
In sum, the resolution cannot be considered to build upon international (customary) law in 
recommending state universal jurisdiction for the international crimes envisaged, which, moreover, 
seem to have been improperly defined or with insufficient legal precision.   
Suggestion: Delete the resolution (alternative suggested below). 
3. In an effort to avoid the abuse of universality, universal jurisdiction should not be applied to crimes 
other than those serious crimes referred in subsection 2. 
Remark: The warning against the abuse of universal jurisdiction in itself is to be welcomed. From 
an international law viewpoint, though, the radical position taken finds no legitimation in 
international law – on the contrary: infringes upon it. Quite some conventions explicitly stipulate 
that state jurisdiction for the offences they cover (and which do not necessarily constitute offences 
under international customary law also) is not excluded where exercised in accordance with 
national law, meaning that states establishing universal jurisdiction over the offences concerned, 
will not act against the terms of international convention law in doing so. 
This is not a plea for the resolution to stick to absolute discretion for states to establish universal 
jurisdiction for any offence they wish or in an unconditioned fashion. On the contrary, confirming 
the traditional Lotus doctrine (PCIJ 1927), according to which states are free to establish 
jurisdiction as they wish so long as they do not contravene an explicit prohibition in international 
law, would be walking a thin line. Not only has the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (ICJ 1986) 
generically softened (some may even argue: altered) the traditional Lotus doctrine (the Court 
having held that something may be contrary to the rules of international law even in the absence 
of a comprehensive and universal prohibition thereof in either customary or conventional 
international law), the discretion of states to establish universal jurisdiction has also been 
convincingly challenged in the Congo v. Belgium case (ICJ 2002), in which – unfortunately – the 
Court has not ruled about the issue. 
Suggestion: Delete the resolution (alternative suggested below). 
4. Future conventions on international crimes should always confirm the applicability of universal 
jurisdiction. 
Remark: Even if it remains unclear what the drafters exactly mean using the notion ‘international 
crimes’, the resolution clearly contradicts the previous one, as there is no doubt that crimes covered 
by international convention law do not necessarily constitute crimes recognized by international 
customary law. 
Suggestion: Delete the resolution (alternative suggested below). 
Suggested insertion of the following resolution: 
States wishing to establish universal jurisdiction in order to prevent impunity for serious crimes 
recognized in either international customary or convention law, including those reflected in the 
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Statute of the ICC, are requested to carefully consider such decision, as international law 
generically does not contain any obligation to do so. 
II. General requirements of the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
Suggestion: Replace title by new title and respective subtitles: General principles (A) in establishing 
universal jurisdiction (jurisdiction to prescribe) and (B) exercising universal jurisdiction (jurisdiction 
to enforce) 
Reason (and further comments relating to the overall structure of the draft resolutions): As the 
draft resolutions below all relate to the exercise of universal jurisdiction (i.e. to jurisdiction to 
enforce, erroneously used as the title for the resolutions under IV, which relate to various issues 
that are all a-specific for the issue of universal jurisdiction), as opposed to the establishment of 
universal jurisdiction (i.e. jurisdiction to prescribe), it is suggested to clearly distinguish between 
both in the congress’ resolutions, logically starting with setting out general principles relating to 
the latter (i.e. in addition to the legitimacy issue covered under I, which – strictly spoken – is also a 
matter of jurisdiction to prescribe only). Further, it is suggested to integrate resolutions having to 
do with conflicts of jurisdiction in the set of resolutions setting out general principles relating to 
jurisdiction to enforce (other than have been inserted under that heading in the initial draft 
resolutions under IV, well-understood).  
II. General principles 
II.A. in establishing jurisdiction (jurisdiction to prescribe) 
New resolution suggested: 
States considering to establish universal jurisdiction, are recommended to make such jurisdiction 
dependent on the conditions that the suspect can be found in their territory (recourse to extradition 
being ruled out) and that the facts concerned constitute punishable offences also under the law of 
the state where they have been committed. 
II.B. in exercising jurisdiction (jurisdiction to enforce) 
1. In the application of universal jurisdiction [suggestion to replace by: Where, unlike recommended 
above, states have chosen to establish universal jurisdiction even in cases where the suspect cannot 
be found in their territory, and where they wish to actually exercise such jurisdiction], a distinction 
should be made between investigation and trial. 
2. Investigation [suggested insertion: on the basis of universal jurisdiction] is admissible in absentia; 
States can *suggested replacement of ‘; states can’ by ‘ , states being allowed in this case to’] 
initiate criminal proceedings, conduct an investigation, preserve evidence, issue an indictment, 
[suggested insertion: issue an international arrest warrant] or request extradition. [suggested 
addition: However, states are recommended not to investigate in absentia unless it can be 
reasonably expected that the presence of the suspect at the hearing of proceedings can be 
ensured]. 
3. The presence of the defendant should be always required for the main proceedings. Therefore 
trials in absentia should be generally refused in cases of universal jurisdiction. 
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Suggested additional resolution: 
Where, unlike recommended above, states have chosen to establish universal jurisdiction even in 
cases where the facts concerned do not constitute punishable offences also under the law of the 
state where they have been committed,  they are recommended to refrain from actually exercising 
such jurisdiction unless it is plausible that sufficient evidence can be gathered without having 
recourse to coercive investigative measures (such as e.g. (house) search, seizure, interception of 
telecommunications, dna sample taking) in the state where the facts have been committed in case 
the taking of these would be hindered there by absence of dual criminality]. 
III. Universal jurisdiction and conflicts of jurisdiction 
Suggestion: Delete title and include relevant resolution(s) relating to conflicts of jurisdiction under 
the  previous (newly created) heading II.B. 
Preliminary remark relating to the initial draft resolutions 1, 4 and 5  below: in terms of substance 
matter dealt with, they can be considered plainly a-specific for the issue of universal jurisdiction, 
and are therefore suggested to be deleted altogether (infra).  
1. International community should establish mechanisms in order to assure the way to determine the 
best and most effective jurisdiction in cases of conflict of multiple jurisdictions. 
Suggestion: Delete the resolution (supra) 
2. As a complementary principle universal jurisdiction should not be dependent to the other  
principles of jurisdiction. The ranking of concurrent jurisdictions proposed by the Resolutions of the 
XVIIth International Congress of Penal Law should be taken into account.  
Remark: The meaning of the first sentence is unclear, even if dependent to’ is read as ‘dependent 
on’ or ‘dependent of’. The reference to the resolutions of the XVIIth Congress in the second 
sentence seems incorrect and therefore irrelevant. The resolutions referred to do not contain a 
‘ranking’ of concurrent jurisdictions, but merely set out a non-hierarchical list of 5 criteria that 
should be taken into account in finding a solution that will best serve the proper administration of 
justice in terms of fair and efficient proceedings. Only the last 2 of them (‘the state in which the 
perpetrator was apprehended’ and ‘the state where evidence is most readily available’, which both 
appear in the next proposed resolution) have a potential linkage with universal jurisdiction.  
Suggestion: Delete the resolution and insert a reference to the XVIIth Congress resolutions in the 
next resolution, rephrasing it altogether. 
3. In cases of conflict of jurisdiction only between States claiming universal jurisdiction [suggested 
replacement of ‘only between states claiming universal jurisdiction’ by: ‘between states among 
which at least one having established universal jurisdiction, preference should in no case be given 
to the latter state unless the suspect can/has been found (and/or apprehended) in its territory or 
evidence is most readily available there] [suggestion to delete the remaining part of the resolution] 
the most appropriate State should be determined with a preference to either the custodial State or 
the State where most of the evidence can be found, taking into account criteria such as the ability of 
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each State to ensure a fair trial and to guarantee the maximum respect for human rights and the 
potential (un)willingness or (in)ability of such States to conduct the proceedings. 
4. Concerning the ne bis in idem principle, a State wishing to exercise universal jurisdiction should 
respect the final decision rendered by the domestic court of another State (or international court) 
regarding the same act. An exception must be made provided for in cases where proceedings before 
the court having exercised universal jurisdiction and rendered the final decision were conducted with 
the aim of shielding the perpetrators from criminal responsibility. Furthermore, a retrial based on 
universal jurisdiction should also be allowed if the first trial was not conducted independently or 
impartially, in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law, or if it was 
conducted in a manner inconsistent with rendering international justice.  
Suggestion: Delete the resolution (supra) 
5. Amnesties, pardons, processes of national reconciliation and statute of limitations should be 
always treated according to their respective (international) regulation; exceptions to the full 
recognition in a foreign State should be made if they were established solely with the aim of 
shielding the perpetrators from true criminal responsibility. 
Suggestion: Delete the resolution (supra) 
6. Procedural immunities as recognized in international law should be respected by State authorities. 
However the case should be referred to the competent international judicial organ, that may allow 
prosecution. Such decision should be taken within a reasonable time. 
Remark: The first sentence of the draft resolution is merely stating the obvious, as it was moreover 
confirmed by the ICJ in its 2002 ruling in the Congo v. Belgium case. The second sentence seems 
also redundant, as for many ‘international crimes’ states may have established universal 
jurisdiction for, there may be no ‘competent international judicial organ’ available to which the 
case may be referred. That procedural immunities are irrelevant before such organs, simply follows 
from international customary law (Nuremberg Charter etc), so that pointing out that these may 
allow prosecution, is again no more than stating the obvious. Moreover, the contents of the 
resolution are also obviously valid when it comes to offences for which states have other than 
universal jurisdiction, so that it is a-specific for the issue at stake.  
Suggestion: Delete the resolution 
IV. Jurisdiction to enforce 
1. An important requirement for the effectiveness and global recognition of universal jurisdiction is 
an independent judiciary which can prevent politically motivated prosecutions. Mechanisms should 
also be established in order to assure that universal jurisdiction is not used for vexatious purposes, 
and to prevent potential abuses of legal processes and unjustified deprivation of individual human 
rights. 
Remark: An independent judiciary etc is to be recommended in any situation. Equally, exercising 
jurisdiction for vexatious purposes, abuse of legal processes and deprivation of individual human 
rights are to be condemned generically. 
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Suggestion: Delete the resolution, because a-specific for the issue of universal jurisdiction. 
2. With regard to procedural questions, national criminal trials conducted on the basis of universal 
jurisdiction should be equitable and expeditious and guarantee fair, impartial and independent 
proceedings, as well as the respect for fundamental human rights. 
Remark: As should be all criminal trials. 
Suggestion: Delete the resolution, because a-specific for the issue of universal jurisdiction. 
3. Conditions to be filled by the international arrest warrant are determined by the national law of 
the prosecuting State, such as an elevated degree of suspicion against the suspect, ground for arrest, 
proportionality or absolute necessity for the public security, prima face evidence. The issuance of an 
international arrest warrant under universal jurisdiction should not be interpreted in a manner 
prejudicial to the presumption of innocence. 
Remark: The resolution is a-specific for the issue of universal jurisdiction. The conditions stated 
should apply in issuing an arrest warrant altogether, even in a merely national setting. Equally, 
Issuing an arrest warrant, even in a mere national setting, should never be prejudicial to the 
presumption of innocence. This is all stating the obvious, moreover.. 
Suggestion: Delete the  of resolution, because a-specific for the issue of universal jurisdiction. 
4. The principle of aut dedere aut judicare should apply to the State, on whose territory the suspect 
or accused is found, in accordance to the criteria set out in part III of the present resolution. 
Remark: The draft resolution is contrary to the respective recommendations (the insertion whereof 
has been suggested above) that states would only establish universal jurisdiction on the condition 
that the suspect can be found in their territory and that, where they have chosen to do so anyway, 
they would not investigate in absentia unless it can be reasonably expected that the presence of 
the suspect at the hearing of proceedings can be ensured. Recommending an aut dedere aut 
iudicare obligation upon the state where the suspect can be found (in casu i.e. another state than 
the one exercising universal jurisdiction), would actually promote states to establish and exercise 
universal jurisdiction in cases where the suspect cannot be found on their territory or where the 
presence of the latter at the hearing of proceedings cannot be ensured. Moreover, given that – as 
outlined earlier, in most cases where the suspect is not present in the territory of the state 
exercising universal jurisdiction and almost always in cases where the suspect is to be found in 
his/her state of nationality, especially when he/she exercise(s)/has exercised a government, 
diplomatic or otherwise official function there, extradition will not be granted, the proposed 
resolution is quite unrealistic, and would be unacceptable to almost any state. 
Suggestion: Delete the resolution 
V. Universal Jurisdiction and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
States are called upon to enhance international cooperation in cases of universal jurisdiction. Such 
cooperation must however not infringe upon fundamental procedural guarantees and human rights. 
Remark: First sentence seems like a hollow phrase only. Second sentence states the obvious. 
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Suggestion: Delete the resolution 
New resolutions suggested:  
In order to prevent that the absence of dual criminality would frustrate the possibilities of 
international cooperation in criminal matters for serious crimes recognized in international 
convention law, states are recommended to criminalize these even where they do not (wish to) 
adhere to the conventions concerned, without this meaning that they should establish also 
jurisdiction over them. 
In this respect, it is to be recalled that establishing universal jurisdiction over such offences may 
even create specific hindrances to routine international cooperation in criminal matters, for a series 
of exceptions and grounds for refusal may/can only be invoked where the requesting member 
state’s jurisdiction is extra-territorial in nature and based on a jurisdiction principle unknown to the 
requesting state for the offence concerned, or, alternatively, where the requested member state 
itself has also jurisdiction over the offences. 
___ 
Proposed consolidated text version: see next pages 
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Proposed consolidated text version 
Preamble 
The participants in the Preparatory Colloquium of the IVth Section of the XVIIIth International 
Congress of the International Association of Penal Law, held in Xi’an (China) (12-15 October 2007); 
Considering that universal jurisdiction may prove valuable to prevent and punish serious crimes 
recognized in either international customary or convention law, including those reflected in the 
Statute of the ICC, by increasing the likelihood of prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators; 
Recognizing that the establishment and exercise of universal jurisdiction by States may remain useful 
in order to prevent impunity for international crimes as mentioned above, even after the 
establishment of the International Criminal Court; 
Mindful that universal jurisdiction has become one of the most controversial topics of criminal law 
related academic and non-academic debates; 
Propose to the XVIIIth International Congress of the International Association of Penal Law the 
adoption of the following Resolution: 
I. Legitimacy of the principle under international law 
1. Universal jurisdiction is a complementary criterion of jurisdiction over crimes committed abroad 
that are not covered by any other jurisdictional principle that this State may have. 
2. States wishing to establish universal jurisdiction in order to prevent impunity for serious crimes 
recognized in either international customary or convention law, including those reflected in the 
Statute of the ICC, are requested to carefully consider such decision, as international law generically 
does not contain any obligation to do so. 
II. General principles 
A. in establishing jurisdiction (jurisdiction to prescribe) 
3. States considering to establish universal jurisdiction, are recommended to make such jurisdiction 
dependent on the conditions that the suspect can be found in their territory (recourse to extradition 
being ruled out) and that the facts concerned constitute punishable offences also under the law of 
the state where they have been committed. 
II.B. in exercising jurisdiction (jurisdiction to enforce) 
4. Where, unlike recommended above, states have chosen to establish universal jurisdiction even in 
cases where the suspect cannot be found in their territory, and where they wish to actually exercise 
such jurisdiction, a distinction should be made between investigation and trial. 
5. Investigation on the basis of universal jurisdiction is admissible in absentia, states being allowed in 
this case to initiate criminal proceedings, conduct an investigation, preserve evidence, issue an 
indictment, issue an international arrest warrant or request extradition. However, states are 
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recommended not to investigate in absentia unless it can be reasonably expected that the presence 
of the suspect at the hearing of proceedings can be ensured. 
6. The presence of the defendant should be always required for the main proceedings. Therefore 
trials in absentia should be generally refused in cases of universal jurisdiction. 
7. Where, unlike recommended above, states have chosen to establish universal jurisdiction even in 
cases where the facts concerned do not constitute punishable offences also under the law of the 
state where they have been committed,  they are recommended to refrain from actually exercising 
such jurisdiction unless it is plausible that sufficient evidence can be gathered without having 
recourse to coercive investigative measures (such as e.g. (house) search, seizure, interception of 
telecommunications, dna sample taking) in the state where the facts have been committed in case 
the taking of these would be hindered there by absence of dual criminality. 
8. In cases of conflict of jurisdiction between states among which at least one having established 
universal jurisdiction, preference should in no case be given to the latter state unless the suspect 
can/has been found (and/or apprehended) in its territory or evidence is most readily available there. 
III. Universal Jurisdiction and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters 
9. In order to prevent that the absence of dual criminality would frustrate the possibilities of 
international cooperation in criminal matters for serious crimes recognized in international 
convention law, states are recommended to criminalize these even where they do not (wish to) 
adhere to the conventions concerned, without this meaning that they should establish also 
jurisdiction over them. 
10. In this respect, it is to be recalled that establishing universal jurisdiction over such offences may 
even create specific hindrances to routine international cooperation in criminal matters, for a series 
of exceptions and grounds for refusal may/can only be invoked where the requesting member state’s 
jurisdiction is extra-territorial in nature and based on a jurisdiction principle unknown to the 
requesting state for the offence concerned, or, alternatively, where the requested member state 
itself has also jurisdiction over the offences. 
 
 
